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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
LA VORA SPENDLOVE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vsNo. 7185
PAUL SHECHUCK, doing business as
AMERICAN WINDOW CLEANING COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE RELATING TO BILL OF
EXCEPTIONS
In this case the appeal on its merits will be without real
substance if the Bill of Exceptions is stricken. The facts are
such that the Supreme Court can not do otherwise than strike
the Bill of Exceptions from the record in accordance with
motion filed herein by the respondent on the 18th day of May,
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1948. If the Bill of Exceptions is stricken, there .will be nothing
before the court for consideration because the appellant did not
raise any questions of law during the trial, and after the jury
returned its verdict and judgment was entered thereon, he
never at any time moved for a new trial. In any event without
the evidence as contained in the Bill of Exceptions before the
appellate court, appellant is really dangling in the air. It is
essential, therefore, that the motion to strike appellant's Bill
of Exceptions be first considered.
The following facts are definitely a matter of record in the
proceedings' of the case:
1. The verdict of the jury was returned and filed on the
23rd day of january, 1948.
2.

When the respondent rested her case, no motion for

nonsuit was made.
3.

A motion for new trial was never made.

4.

A Bill of Exceptions was not prepared, served, settled,

or filed within a thirty day period after the return of the verdict of the jury, and the entry of judgment thereon.
5.

No application was made to the trial court within

thirty days after the entry of judgment on the verdict for an
extension of time within which to prepare, serve, settle, and
file the Bill of Exceptions, and no extension of time was granted
within said thirty day period, or at all.
6.

The purported Bill of Exceptions was served upon the

attorneys for the respondent on the 24th day of April, 1948, more
than ninety days after the entry of the judgment on the verdict.
Up to that time no application for an extension of time within
which to have the Bill of Exceptions prepared, served, settled,
2
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or filed was applied for or granted, and no such extension has
yet been applied for or granted.
7. When the purported Bill of Exceptions was served
upon the attorneys for the respondertt they were asked to stipulate that it was a true Bill of Exceptions, and that it might be
settled and signed by the court. The respondent through her
attorneys refused to sign said stipulation as prese~ted, but
added thereto the following words, "subject, however, to all
rights of the plaintiff to move to strike said Bill or to take such
steps as provided by law because of failure of the defendant to
prepare, settle, and file said Bill in the time and manner provided by law."
8. Without any application being made to the court by
the defendant and appellant to be relieved of his default, the
trial judge on April 24, 1948, signed a certificate purporting to
settled the Bill of Exceptions served upon the attorneys for
the respondent, and the purported Bill of Exceptions was filed
in the Supreme Court on the 5th day of May, 1948.
10. In due course the respondent filed ~ motion in the
Supreme Court in which she moved to strike from the records
the purported Bill of Exceptions on the following grounds:
( 1) That said Bill of Exceptions was not prepared, served,
and filed within the time required by law; (2) That no extension
for the service and filing of said Bill of Exceptions' was ever
requested or granted during the time required by law; (3)
That no motion was made by the appellant during the time
required by law for new trial in the above entitled case after the
entry of judgment on the verdict of the jury in said case; ( 4)
That the said Bill of Exceptions was served, settled, and filed
after the expiration for the time for appeal herein and over
3
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the protest of the plaintiff through her counsel.
11. That on the lOth day of May, 1948, after the filing of
the purported Bill of Exceptions in the Supreme Court, the attorney for the appellant served upon the attorneys for the
respondent a certain paper designated Application for Relief
in which the attorney for the appellant moved to be relieved of
his default for failure to serve and file his Bill of Exceptions
within the time required by law upon the grounds of inadvertence, mistake, and excusable neglect, said motion specifically
stating "this motion is made and will be supported upon the ·
affidavit of Ira A. Huggins, attorney for said defendant." With
the Application for Relief was served an affidavit by Ira A.
Huggins in which he stated that a verdict was entered in favor
of the respondent and against the appellant on january 23,
1948; that about two weeks thereafter, the affiant ordered
preparation of a transcript and Bill of Exceptions from a court
reporter; the transcript and Bill of Exceptions were completed
and· delivered about the 16th day of April,' 1948; that said Bill
of Exceptions was serv_ed upon the plaintiff's attorneys on
April 24, 1948; that said Bill of Exceptions was signed by the
trial judge on April 24, 1948 and filed with the trial court April
29, 1948; that the affiant failed to apply for an extension of
time within which to prepare and file his Bill of Exceptions
because he misread Section 104-39-4, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, and thought that he had thirty days from the service of
notice of appeal in which to prepare and file his Bill of Exceptions.

•

12. The respondent filed objections to the granting of the
application upon the grounds that the court was without jurisdiction to grant any relief; that the affidavit filed in support of
the motion does not set forth facts sufficient to constitute
4
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grounds for relief; that no motion for new trial was made and
that no Bill of Exceptions could have been filed; and that no extension of time was requested or granted for the filing of a
Bill of Exceptions until after more than ninety days had expired after the entry of judgment on the verdict.
12. The court heard the application of the appellant to be
relieved of default on the 18th day of May, 1948 and made purported findings, conclusions of law and an order. From the
courts findings these things appear:
(1) No motion for new trial was ever made; (2) Approximately two weeks after the entry of judgment on the verdict,
the appellant's attorney was directed by the appellant to effect
an appeal; that immediately upon being directed to take the
appeal the attorney for appellant ordered a transcript and Bill
of Exceptions from the court reporter; that appellant's attorney
misread the law and thought he had thirty days from the day
that he served his notice of appeal in which to prepare and
settle his Bill of Exceptions.
13. Based upon the said findings the trial judge signed
an order purporting to relieve the appellant of his default, but
did not enter an order extending the time of appellant to serVe,
settle, and file a Bill of Exceptions, and that after the entry
of the purported order relieving defendant of his default no
Bill of Exceptions was served or filed.
Now before attempting to argue this case on its merits,
or to make any statement concerning what is shown by the
evidence contained in the Bill of Exceptions, we present the
following argument in support of our motion to strike the BilJ
of Exceptions:
5
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I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT POWER TO SETTLE THE PURPORTED BILL OF EXCEPTIONS ON APRIL
24, 1948.
The law is definitely settled in the State of Utah "in an
unbroken line of decisions that in case the party who desires
an extension of time fails to apply for such extension at some
time before the statutory time, or any extension thereof, has
expired, the district court or judge is without power thereafter
to allow, settle and sign a bill of exceptions." Moyle v. McKean
et al, 49 Utah 93, 162 Pac. 63.
The beginning point in the consideration of this question,
of course, is the statute (Section 104-39-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) which reads in part as follows:
"When a party desires to have exceptions taken at a
trial set~led in a bill of exceptions, he may, within thirty
days after the entry of judgment, if the action was tried
with a jury, or after the service of notice of the entry of
judgment, if the action was tried without a jury, or after
service of notice of the determination of motion for a new
trial, prepare a draft of the bill and serve the same, or a
copy thereof, upon the adverse party."
This was formerly Section 6969, Compiled Laws of Utah,
1917, and prior to that time was Se.ction 3005, Compiled Laws
of Utah, 1907. It is Sec. 104-39-4 in Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933.
In the case of Tooele Improvement Company vs. Hoffman,
44 Utah 532, 141 Pac. 744, the Utah Supreme Court in construing the 1907 statute said:
"This court has repeatedly held that while the District
6
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Court may, before the statutory period for serving the bill
of exceptions has elapsed, extend the time 'upon good
cause shown,' as provided in Section 3329, it is without
authority to grant such extension if, at the time the application is made, the statutory time for service of the bill
has fully expired. Butter vs. Lampson, 29 Utah 439, 82 Pac.
473; Bryant vs. Kunkel, 32 Utah 377, 90 Pac. 1079; Warnock Ins. Agency vs. Peterson Inv. Co., 35 Utah 542, 101
Pac. 699; Metz vs. Jackson, 43 Utah 496, 136 Pac. 784. On
authority of these cases, which we think were correctly
decided, the motion to strike the bill of objections is sustained."
In the case of Independent Gas & Oil Co. vs. Beneficial Oil
Co. et al, 71 Utah 348, 266 Pac. 267, the question of serving a
bill of exceptions within the prescribed period under the provisions of Section 6969, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, with
other applicable Sections from the same code, was before the
court. Speaking through Mr. justice Hansen, the court said:
"The following provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917
fix the time within which a bill of exceptions shall be prepared and served. We quote only such part of the laws as
are deemed material to the question here involved:
'Sec. 6969. When a party desires to have exceptions
taken at a trial settled in a bill of exceptions, he may, within
thirty days after the entry of judgment if the action were
tried with a jury, or after service of notice of the entry of
judgment if the action were tried without a jury, or after
service of notice of the determination of a motion for a
new trial, prepare a draft of a bill and serve the same, or
a copy thereof, upon the adverse party. * * *'
'Sec. 7023. When an act to be done as provided in this
Code relates to * * * the preparation, service, filing, or
presentment of bills of exception, or of amendments thereto, * * * the time allowed by this Code may be extended,
7
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upon good cause shown, by the court in which the action
is pending, or by a judge thereof.'
'Sec. 6619. The court may, in furtherance of justice,
such terms as may be just, relieve a party or his
- legal representative from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.'

* * * upon

"After the time fixed by Comp. Laws Utah 1917, No.
6969, had expired, without any further extension of time as
provided by Comp. Laws 1917, No. 7023, the district court
was without jurisdiction or power to grant further time
until the defendants had first been relieved from their
default in failing to keep alive the time in which to prepare
and serve their bill of exceptions. Such has been the re.peated and uniform holdings of this court. Butter v. Lamson, 29 Utah 439, 82 P. 473; Bryant v. Kunkel, 32 Utah 377,
90 P. 1079; Warnock Ins. Agency v. Peterson lnv. Co., 35
Utah 542, 101 P. 699; Metz v. jackson, 43 Utah 496, 136 P.
784; Tooele Imp. Co. v. Hoffman, 44 Utah 532, 141 P. 744;
Allen v. Garner, 45 Utah 39, 143 P. 228; McEwan v. Anderson, 50 Utah 317, 167 P. 685; State v. Martin, 149 Utah 136,
164 P. 500.
"In order to invoke the jurisdiction or power of the
district court to revive and grant further time in which
defendants may prepare and serve their bill of exceptions
under 'the provisions of Comp .. Laws of Utah 1917, Sec.
6619, it was necessary for them to make a proper application and showing. Morgan v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 29 Utah 92,
74 P. 523; Felt v. Cook, 31 Utah 299, 87 P. 1092; Tooele
Imp. Co. v. Hoffman, and Allen v. Garner, supra."
In the case of Findlay v. National Union Indemnity Co.,
85 Utah 110, 38 P. 2d 760, this court went rather extensively
into the question relating to the time for the service of a bill
of exceptions. Speaking through justice Moffat, the court said:
8
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"In the instant case the cause was tried, judgment entered, and a mo.tion for a new trial filed and heard. The
motion was denied on the 15th day of March, 1932. Notice
thereof was served by the plaintiff on the 16th of March
and filed with the clerk of the court the day following. Thus
under the statute the time within which the bill of exceptions must be prepared and served started to run by the
service of the notice of determination· of the motion for a
new trial. Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, Sec. 6969, as amended
by Laws Utah 1925, c. 51. That statute, by which this case
is controlled, now amended and superseded by R. S. Utah
1933, 104-39-4, reads:
'When a party desires to have exceptions taken at a
trial settled in. a bill of exceptions, he may, within thirty
days after the entry of judgment if the action were tried
with a jury, or after service of a notice of the entry of
judgment if the action were tried without a jury, or after
service of notice of the determination of a motion· for a
new trial or in ~ase an appeal is taken before the bill of
exceptions is settled service of the notice aforesaid shall
not be necessary anq the appellant shall, within thirty days
after service of his notice of appeal, prepare a draft of a
bill and serve the same, or a copy thereof, upon the adverse
party. * * *'
·
"When a judgment is entered, the losing party has a
right of appeal. This is a transient right, and, if not perfected within the six-month period, the right of appeal is
lost and ceases to exist. R. S. 1933, 104-41-2. As a part of
the record on appeal; the bill of exceptions may or may
not be incorporated therein, depending J.Ipon the nature of
the question sought to be reviewed therein. The right to
have the bill of exceptions included in the record on appeal
is given not without limitations, hut is contingent upon
the doing of the prescribed acts and within the time fixed.
When a party desires to have the exceptions he has taken
at the trial settled in a bill of exceptions, he may within
9
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thirty days after the entry of judgment, if the action were
tried to a jury and no motion for a n~w trial has been interposed, have his bill of exceptions settled, or, if the action
were tried to the court, he may have the bill of exceptions
settled within thirty days after the service of notice of the
entry of judgment, or, if the cause were tried to the court
or to the court sitting with a jury and a motion for a new
trial interposed, he may have his bill of exceptions settled
and signed within thirty days after the service of notice
of the determination of the motion for a new trial.
"Before the amendment of 1925, the foregoing were
the only limitations, except the ninety-day limitation hereinbefore referred to, relating to the preparing, serving, settling, and signing of the bill of exceptions. Under the provisions of the statute, the time limitations began running
automaticalfy upon the entry of a judgment ,on the verdict,
when the cause was tried to a jury, if no motion for a new
trial had been filed within time. By the other provisions of
the statute prior to the amendment, service of a notice of
the entry of judgment or service of notice of determination of the motion for a new trial was necessary to start
the running of the t'ime limitation relating to the settlement of the bill of exception·s. The 1925 amendment added
to the section (Comp. Laws 1917, Sec. 6969, as amended
by Laws 1925, c. 51) the words:
'Or in case an appeal is taken before the bill of exceptions is settled service of the notice aforesaid shall not be
necessary (to start the time to run) and the appellant shall,
within thirty days after service of his notice of appeal, prepare a draft of a bill and serve the same, or a copy thereof,
upon the adverse party." (Parenthetical phrase added.)
"Counsel for appellant insists that the amendment last
above quoted gives a fourth and alternative way by which
the parties to an appeal may start the time to run within
which the preparation and settlement of the bill must be
made, regardless of whether the notices referred to have
10
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been served. We think counsel is in error in this convention.
"In passing, it might be of value especially as to cases
arising in the future and for the purpose of indicating the
court's position upon this question to advert to the further
amendment of the same part of the section involved herein
as now contained in R. 8_. 1933, 104-39-4. In the 1933 revision the section is now divided into six subparagraphs. "
The ninety-day limitation heretofore referred to has been
omitted and repealed; some other omissions have been
made. Except for the omissions we think the meaning and
purpose of the statute have not been changed. Subparagraph (2) of the amended section now 104-39-4, reads:
'In case an appeal is taken before the bill of exceptions
is settled, service of the notices aforesaid shall not be necessary and time shall run from service of his notice of
appeal.'
"Adverting now to the construction of that part of
the section of the statute in question: It is to be observed
that fundamentally the statute is procedural in nature and
limitational in purpose and effect. It requires a notice to
set the time running in all cases tried to the court with or
without a motion for a new-trial and in cases tried to a
jury when a motion for a new trial has been filed and determined. Time begins to run automatically upon entry of
judgment on the verdict if no motion for a new trial has
been filed, and in any case by the service of notice of
appeal. When the time limitation fixed by the statute has
been started running by any one of the methods provided
by the statute, except by notice of appeal, may such time
as has elapsed be cut off and the time started to run anew
and from the date of the services of notice of appeal? We
think it was neither the purpose of the statute nor the intention of the Legislature in making the amendment to thus
permit an extension of time when once started as provided
by the statute: 'In case an appeal is taken before the bill
of exceptions is settled service of the notices aforesaid

11
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shall not be necessary' to start the time running within
which to prepare and serve the bill of exceptions. When
the time has once been started by the service of the required notice, it may no more be cut off by serving and
filing a subsequent notice of appeal than the time could be
similarly cut off in case of entry of judgment on a verdict
where no notice is necessary in the absence of a motion
for a new trial. The appeal method of starting the time to
run is applicable only when time has not already been
started to run either by notice or by the provision of the,
statute without notice.
"It is conceded by counsel that the order of April 29,
1932, extending the time for sixty days after May 1, 1932,
in which to prepare, serve, have settled, and file the bill of
exceptions, was entered without any proceedings under
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 6619, to relieve appellant from
its default. The notice of determination of the motion for
a new trial was served on March 16, 1932. This notice
started the time running within which the settlement of
the bill must be made, unless the time was extended by
proper proceedings as by the statute provided. The order
of April 29, 1932, was more than thirty days after the service of the notice. No application was made to the district
court, and no showing suggested to that court for relief.
In the absence of an application to be relieved and showing
justifying such relief, the district court lost jurisdiction to
make the order of April 29, 1932, extending the time within
which the bill of exceptions could be settled by that court.
"It being clear under the statute that the time within
which' to prepare and serve the bill of exceptions began
running on March 16, 1932, the date of service of the notice
of determination of the motion for a new trial, the doctrine
heretofore laid down by this court in the case of Independent Gas & Oil Co. v. Beneficial Oil Co., 71 Utah 348,
266 P. 267, 269, and cases therein cited, it determinative of
the matter.

12
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See following additional cases: Keller vs. Chournos, 95 U t.
25, 76 P. 2nd 625; Foxley v. Gallagher, 55 Ut. 298, 185 Pac. 775;
In re Peterson, 87 Ut. 144, 48 Pac. 2nd 468; Prunty v. Equitable
Life Assur., 86 Ut. 236, 42 P. 2nd 219; Metz v. jackson, 43 Ut.
496.
It appears conclusively, therefore, that the purported bill

of exceptions served on April 24, 1948, and signed by the trial
judge on the same date was a nullity.
Unless, therefore, appellant's right to serve and file a bill
of exceptions was revived in some manner, the alleged bill of
exceptions must be stricken. See Warnock Ins. Agency v. Peterson, 35 Ut. 542.
II.

THERE HAVE BEEN NO VALID PROCEEDINGS BY
WHICH APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO PREPARE, SERVE AND
FILE A BILL OF EXCEPTIONS HAS BEEN RESTORED.
If it be conceded for the purpose of this argument that

there are cases in which relief may be granted under the provisions of Section 104-14-4, U. C. A. 1943, the instant case surely
cannot be brought within that category. The Utah State Supreme Court has repeatedly held that while ex parte extensions
for the preparation, serving and filing of bills of exception
are granted readily, and the reason for the extensions is seldom,
if ever, questioned, where the application for the extension is
made within the thirty-day period, or some timely extension
thereof, yet there is a difference where application for extension is first made after more than thirty days have lapsed.
Keller vs. Chournos, 95 Ut. 25, 76 P. 2nd 626; Prunty vs. Equitable Life etc. 86 Ut. 236, 42 P. 2nd 219.
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In the Prunty case, supra, the court citing with approval the
holding in Tooele Improvement Co. vs. Hoffman, 44 Ut. 532,
held that:
Where an applicant seeks relief under the provisiOns
of 104-14-4, "the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief, unless an application and showing is made to the court
upon which it can base findings for or against the application. * * * The findings and order, when properly served
and made a part of the record on appeal, may then be reviewed by .this court upon the application of either party
the same as any other ruling in the case. For these reasons,
therefore, it is necessary that the application and showing
be sufficient in form and substance to authorize the court
to act." Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman, supra.
The court is not empowered to use an imaginary or insufficient reason to set aside a,n applicant's default, but must require substantial grounds. Any order setting aside a default
must be based upon adequate findings. See Chournos case,
supra; Findlay vs. National Ind. Co., 85 Ut. 110.
If it be assumed that a proper application was made for
reinstatement of the appellant's rights in this case (which is
contrary to the facts as will be pointed out) yet no showing was

made entitling appellant to relief.
Moyle vs. McKean, 49 Utah 93, is controlling in the instant
case, even if we indulge the presumption that a proper application for relief was made. In the McKean case the court pointed
out that if application is made to be relieved from a default
such as we are considering, certain procedure must be followed, and an adequate showing made. The court stated the
law as follows:
"The applicant must, however, make a proper showing
of facts from which the court is authorized to find that
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the delay and failure to act timely on his part is excusable,
and the court, or judge, must make findings of that fact
which, at the instance of the opposing party, may be reviewed by this court. The district court, or judge, under
Section 3005, may not assume arbitrary power and allow
and sign a bill of exceptions out of time, but can do so only
when good and sufficient cause is made to appear. In this
case, as in Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman, supra,
the facts upon which appellants' counsel rely are wholly
insufficient to authorize any court or judge to grant relief
under Section 3005. While one of appellants' counsel has
filed a voluminous affidavit in support of his application,
yet practically the only facts upon which counsel relies, and
upon which the district judge apparently acted in allowing
and signing the proposed bill are as follows:
"That it has been some years since affiant in person
has been charged with the taking and perfection of an
appeal, such matters having been committed to other members of the firm of which affiant is a member.
'That affiant, knowing that the law permitted him six
months after judgment within which to take the initial step
to appeal, namely, the filing of a notice, and, for the 'time,
overlooking the requirement that the trouble and expense
(in this case $240) of procuring and serving a bill of exceptions must be undertaken months before it is necessary
to serve a notice of appeal, or, in the alternative, that the
discretion of the trial judge should be invoked in order to
secure such extensions of time as might be neces~~ry to
permit a party to determine whether or not to appeal or to
procure his record, inadvertently mistook and overlooked
the time within which the service of the bill should be
made, affiant believing that such service and filing would
be timely if made so as to permit the transcript to be filed
in the Supreme Court within thirty days after the perfection of the bill as provided in rule II of the Supreme Court
rules.
15.
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'Affiant further states that he was induced to believe
he was moving within the proper time because of the physical impossibility in this case, and in all other cases where
the transcript is voluminous and the appeal is on the entire
record, of procuring and serving a draft of the bill of exceptions within thirty days after notice of judgment.'
"The district judge made no findings, and, apart from
'the foregoing statements, the record is destitute of anything from which we can determine what induced him to
act. The facts presented by counsel as an excuse for a
delay of more than six months in preparing and serving
their proposed bill of exceptions were, therefore, as pointed
out in Felt v. Cook, 31 Utah 299, 87 Pac. 1092, and in
Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman, supra, wholly insufficient to set in motion the jurisdiction or power of the
district judge, or to authorize him to act. Appellant's counsel, however, invoke the rule that we must presume that
the district court acted regularly and for sufficient cause.
That rule has no application here, since the record affirmatively shows upon what grounds the court based its action.
Where the record speaks, presumptions may not be indulged."
In the case of Keller v. Chournos, 95 Utah 25, 76 P. 2nd
626, proceedings were instituted by the appellant to be relieved
of his default for failure to serve and file his bill of exceptions
within the time required by law.
In that case a motion for a new trial was denied by the
court on August 10, 1936. Notice of the ruling denying the
motion for new trial was served on August 12, 1936.
"Thereafter, counsel for plaintiff secured an extension
of time, in which to prepare and settle the bill of exceptions
on the appeal until November 1, 1936."
The Supreme Court took the following position:
"Summarizing what was stated before the trial court
16
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as a basis for the relief sought, it appears that judgment
was entered July 13, 1936; motion for a new trial overruled
August 10, 1936; and notice served of the overruling of
the motion for a new trial August 12, 1936. On July 13,
1936, after the decree had been entered, counsel for appellant directed the court reporter to prepare a transcript,
and requested him to take care of obtaining necessary
extensions of time, which was agreed to by the reporter.
Accordingly on August 29, 1936, he obtained an order
giving appellant until November 1, 1936, to prepare and
serve the bill. On July 14, 1936, the reporter, by letter,
asked counsel for a deposit of $100 in part payment for
preparing the transcript and on July 15, 1936, counsel for
plaintiff replied:
'As soon as the situation seems to warrant it, I shall
have Mr. Keller advance $100.00 to apply upon the record.'
"Whether right or wrong, the reporter seems to have
assumed that this letter amounted to a cancellation of the
order for the transcript and therefore took no further action
in the matter. Early in November, 1936, counsel for defendant called the attention of counsel for plaintiff to the
fact that his time for preparing and filing his· bill of exceptions had expired and suggested a payment of the judgment. Notwithstanding this information and request, it
was not until sometime in January, 1937, that counsel for
plaintiff directed the reporter to proceed with the preparation of the transcript. It appears that the transcript was
completed and delivered on February 27, 1937. It was not
until June 10, 1937, that counsel for plaintiff took any action seeking to obtain relief from his default. The court
has jurisdiction under provisions of section 104-14-4, R. S.
Utah 1933, to grant relief sought in this case upon a proper
showing. This section provides that the court may, 'upon
such terms as may be just, relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, sur-
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prise, or excusable neglect.'
"It has been held that the preparation and settlement
of a bill of exceptions is a proceeding in a pending action,
and that in case a party has failed to prepare, serve, and
file his bill of exceptions within the statutory time he may
apply to the court for relief; and, if he can show that he
failed to do so through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect, under the section above quoted, the
court could relieve him and make an order settling the bill
of exceptions to be served and filed although the statutory
time had fully elapsed.

"There is a difference, however, between being relieved before the time for settlement has elapsed and after.
In the first instance, it is ~ matter of discretion of the
court and is us~ally upon request ex parte granted; in the
latter, the court's jurisdiction must be properly invoked
and proof submitted and findings made showing cause for
relief. In the case of Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman,
44 Utah 532, 141 P. 744, 745, in construing the above-quoted
section, Comp. Laws Utah, 1907, section 3005, carried into
Comp. Laws, 1917, Sec. 6619, then as section 104-14-4, R. S.
Utah 1933, this court said:
'The court is without jurisdiction to grant relief, unless
an application and showing is made to the court upon which
it can base findings for or against the application. If the
court finds the showing sufficient to authorize the relief
sought, it should make an order allowing the proposed bill
of exceptions to be served, and, if it finds the showing insufficient, make an order to the contrary. The findings and
order, when properly served and made a part of the record
on appeal, may then be reviewed by this court upon the
application of either party the same as any other ruling in
the case.'
·
"It will thus be seen that we may then review both the
findings and order.
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"In the instant case no findings were made upon which
to base the order, and an examination of the evidence indicates that there was no proper showing justifying a finding
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
State·v. Bartholomew, 85 Utah 94, 38 P. 2nd 753, and cases
cited, are in point."
The case of Prunty v. Equitable Life, supra (86 Utah 236)
is also in point. In that case application to be relieved from
default was also filed. In the words of the Supreme Court,
"The affidavit states that a stenographer was instructed to file the bill of exceptions, that affiant went on
a vacation, and by inadvertence and mistake the bill was
not filed in time. No findings were made upon the so-Galled
application or motion to be relieved. Indeed, it would seem
difficult without more to frame anything worthy of the
name of a finding. The court's order recited that for good
cause shown, the applicant was relieved from default if
any existed. This brings nothing in the nature of a finding
here for review and in any view of the matter is insufficient. Tooele Improvement Co. v. Hoffman, supra;· Independent Gas & Oil Co. v. Beneficial Oil Co., supra; Morgan v. Oregon S. L. R. Co,, 27 Utah 92, 74 P. 523; Felt v.
Cook, 31 Utah 299, 87 P. 1092; and Allen v. Garner, supra."
It will thus be seen that our Supreme Court has definitely
decided that while the power resides in the court to relieve a
party of his default for failure to prepare and serve a bill of
exceptions within the time prescribed by statute, yet proceedings must be instituted in a proper way to obtain relief. There
must be substantial evidence of inadvertence and excusable
neglect. It doesn't lie within the discretion of the court to find
~xcusable neglect unless there is real evidence to support such

a finding.
Let us now examine what happened in the instant case.
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The district court had no jurisdiction to grant an extension
of time to the appellant after the 23rd day of February, 1948,
since the judgment was entered on the verdict on January 23,
1948, as shown in the judgment roll, page 040. However, no
proposed bill of exceptions was served until April 24, 1948. In
the meantime no application for an. extension had been made
or granted, and no motion for new trial had been made. Obviously, therefore, under the holdings of the Utah Supreme
Court hereinbefore cited, the purported service and settlement
of the bill of exceptions on April 24, 1948, were null and void.
It was not until the lOth day of May, 1948, that the attorney

for the appellant served upon the attorney for the respondent
a paper which was designated "APPLICATION FOR RELIEF"
(See page 3, Supplemental Bill of Exceptions).
That application for relief mo~ed "for relief, as provided
in Section 104-14-4, U. C. A., 1943, because of the failure of
the defendant to serve and file his bill of exceptions in the
above entitled case within the time provided for by Section
104-39-4, U C. A., 1943, upon the grounds of inadvertehce, mistake and excusable neglect. This motion is made and will be
supported upon the affidavit of Ira A. Huggins, attorney for
said def~ndant." There was nothing in the application to indicate
that the appellant intended to do anything except support .his
motion by the affidavit which was served with the motion.
In the affidavit (See Pages 1 and 2 of Supplemental Bill
of Exceptions) the attorney for the appellant sets forth that
the verdict of the jury was returned on January 23, 1948; "that
approximately two weeks thereafter, affiant ordered the preparation of a transcript and bill of exceptions in the case from
Simon Barlow, the court reporter in said court in said cause."
That the affiant received the transcript about April 16, 1948;
20
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that he submitted it to plaintiff's attorney about April 24, 1948.
At this point the affiant overlooks an obvious and important
part of the record. He says that a stipulation was signed to the
effect that the transcript as served upon the attorney for respondent was true and correct and might be settled by the judge
as such. However, the stipulation now in the record contains
the following words in the handwriting of one of the attorneys
for the respondent:
"Subject, however, to all rights of plaintiff to move to
strike said bill or to take such steps as provided by law
because of the failure of defendant to prepare, settle and
file said bill in the time and manner provided by law."
Obviously, up to that point in the affidavit there is nothing
warranting any relief from default. Affiant then proceeds in
his affidavit to state in substance that the reason he didn't
apply to the court for an extension of time within the thirty-day
period was because he misunderstood the provisions of subdivision 2 of Section 104-39-4, U C. A., 1943, and thought he
had thirty days after service of his notice of appeal in which
to serve and file his bill of exceptions, and that he didn't become
aware of his mistake until he rechecked the statute on April 21,
1948. He doesn't state, however, what caused him to put a different meaning into the statute on April 21, than he got out
of it about the 10th of February.
The last paragraph of the affidavit merely contains a
statement to the effect that the affiant believes he has grounds
for appeal and that the case can't properly be reviewed without
a bill of exceptions.
In substance, therefore, all that the attorney for the appellant says in his affidavit is that he misunderstood the obvious
provisions of the law as contained in Section 104-39-4, U. C. A.
21
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1943, relating to the
exception.

p~epatation,

serving and filing of bills of

As early as 1934, the Utah Supreme Court passed upon this
very question in the case of Findlay v. ~ational Union Indemnity
Co., 85 Ut. 110, cited at length in the previous pages of this
brief. The provisions of the statute now under consideration
which were then contained in R. S. of Utah, 1933, were discussed
and definitely construed. In that case it was specifically urged
that the statute gave thirty days from the date of the service
o·f the notice of appeal in which to serve and file the bill of
exceptions. The court held that the contention was erroneous,
and that all the statute meant was that if the time had not
already started to run that the filing of a notice of appeal
started the time to pass for the filing of the bill of exceptions.
If to ignore a law which is so well established comprises inadvertence and excusable neglect then to ignore or misinterpret
any and all other provisions of law could at any time be urged
as grounds for relief.
But, let us look a bit further into this case. There is nothing
in the application of the appellant requesting an order permitting the serving and filing of the bill of exceptions within a
specified time. Nor does the order of the court grant the appellant any additional time, or fix any time in which to file a
bill of exceptions or authorize the filing of a bill of exceptions.
The order of the court found on Page 10 of the Supplemental
Bill of Exceptions reads as follows:
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant
Paul Schewchuck sho·uld be in the furtherance of justice,
and he is hereby relieved of any default or apparent default
in failing to prepare, serve and file his bill of exceptions in
said case within the time fixed by statute pursuant to the
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Section 104-14-4, U. C. A., 1943.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's objections to the granting of relief as prayed in defendant's
petition for relief should be and the same hereby are overruled and denied. Dated and signed this 21st day of May,
1948, john A. Hendricks, judge."
Now if the court was without jurisdiction to settle the bill
of exceptions on April 24, 1948, and the bill served upon the
respondent on that date was a nullity, there was, therefore, in
effect no bill of exceptions served or filed when the court entered its order on May 21, 1948.
The records fail to disclose any attempt whatever to serve
or file a bill of exceptions after the court purportedly relieved
the appellant of his default. There was no attempt even to make
a nunc .pro tunc order validating the purported bill of exceptions. In substance, therefore, no bill of exceptions has yet been
served or filed.
The plaintiff and respondent objected to the purported
proceedings contained in the Supplemental Bill of Exceptions .
. We, therefore, submit that the bill of exceptions must be
stricken because it was not served and filed within the time
required by law, and there has never been any valid proceedings upon which to ground a claim that the rights of the appellant to prepare, serve and file his bill of exceptions have
been revived.
III.

THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL BASED
SOLELY UPON THE JUDGMENT ROLL.
If the bill of exceptions is stricken, as it must be, then the
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only think left before the court really is the appellant's general
demurrer to the respondent's amended and supplemental complaint. On this question the only point argued in appellant's
brief is that the amended and supplemental complaint is defec- ·
tive in that it does not contain allegations asserting affirmatively that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence.
That is a strange contention in the face of the allegation
"that as the plaintiff approached the point where the agent of
the defendant was cleaning said windows said employee had the
window cleaner with the long handle extended vertically into
the air parallel with the window, but as the plaintiff reached a
point e.ven with the said employee the said agent carelessly,
recklessly and negligently, without looking and without any
regard for the safety of pedestrians using the sidewalk and
particularly for the safety of the plaintiff, suddenly pulled said
long handled window cleaner down without turning around and
negligently, recklessly, carelessly and suddenly thrust the
handle of said window cleaner across the sidewalk so as to suddenly project the said handle between the legs of the plaintiff
and trip her so that she fell to the paved sidewalk with great
force."
Certainly it is the law according to the overwhelming
weight of authority that the plaintiff is not required by affirmative allegations in the complaint to negative the possibility
of contributory negligence. That is entirely a matter of affirmative defense.
As stated in 38 Am. jur. 959,
"According to the practice prevailing in most states,
the plaintiff in an action for injuries claimed to have been
24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

due to the defendant's negligence need not, unless the
statement of his case indicates probability of contributory
negligence on his part, allege specifically that he was free
from negligence at the time of the acts of which complaint
is made. As it sometimes is expressed, the plaintiff need
not negative contributory negligence; or ne~d the plaintiff
allege a want of knowledge of the danger from which his
injury resulted, for such an allegation is no more than a
denial of contributory negligence. A motion by the defendant to require the complaint in an action for injuries to
be made more specific as regards facts which, if incorporated in the complaint would have related to the question of contributory negligence, is properly denied, for
contributory negligence is a matter of defense."
And on page 960 the text continues,
"The jury, by finding the defendant guilty of negligence, impliedly finds that the plaintiff had no knowledge
thereof. Thus, it would seem to be sufficient to allege that
the plaintiff's injury was caused solely by the negligence of
the defendant.
"Contributory negligence is a matter of defense, and
the burden of proving such a defense is on the defendant
in a personal injury case or in an action to recover for
wrongful death, and plaintiff's complaint need not show
freedom from contributory negligence." Michigan C. R.
Co. v. Spindler, 5 N. E. 2 (d) 632.
STATEMENT OF CASE ON ASSUMPTION
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS IS NOT STRICKEN
Now, let us turn to the consideration of the case on the
theory that the Bill of Exceptions is before the court.
The appellant devotes the bulk of his brief to an argument
on contributory negligence. He takes the position not only that
freedom from contributory negligence must be alleged in the
25
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complaint but that the facts in this case clearly indicate contributory negligence.
However, the defendant in his answer failed to make
proper allegations of contributory negligence. (See paragraph
5 of Answer, page 015 judgment roll).
The test of whether or not a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence is set forth in 38 Am. jur. at 858 where it is
stated "Negligence is essentially a matter of faulty conduct in
the manner of acting or in failure to act. A plaintiff is guilty
of contributory negligence only in so far as he, or some person
for whose conduct he is responsible, is at fault. A plaintiff's
right to recover is not affected by his having contributed to
his injury unless he was in fault in so doing. Fault can be
predicated upon the plaintiff's' conduct only where such conduct was in violation of a duty on his part to exercise care.
Otherwise stated, there is no negligence without the violation
of some duty, and there can be no contributory negligence when
no duty is placed on the plaintiff to exercise care. Contributory
negligence, it has been said by the courts, is the neglect of the
duty imposed upon all men to observe ordinary care for their
own safe.ty. It is the doing of something that a person of ordinary prudence would not do, under the circumstances. Before one can be held to have been guilty of contributo,ry negligence, the court must find that some specific act or omission
did not meet the standards exacted by law. Therefore, essentially, contributory negligence is tortious conduct. As hereinbefore stated, however, the chain of causation between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury may be broken,
so that the defendant will be relieved of liability, by an independent act of the plaintiff, not within the reasonable contem-
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plation of the defendant, which intervenes as an efficient and
responsible cause of the injury, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff was at fault."
What act of negligence on the part of the plaintiff can the
defendant possible point out? She was walking down a public
sidewalk. She had a right to assume that other persons using
the sidewalk would exercise due care. How could she possibly
anticipate that the agent of the defendant would suddenly
thrust the long handle of the mop he was using across the sidewalk between her legs so as to trip her. Surely there was
nothing in the conduct of the defendant's agent when he had
his long handled mop straight in the air parallel with the window
to indicate that he would do anything but pull the mop down
to the sidewalk parallel to the window as proper care required.
The defendant has labored hard in his brief to establish a
showing' of contributory negligence but there is not an iota of
evidence anywhere in the record to indicate contributory negligence. As a matter of fact, Archie Hood, who it is stipulated
was an employee of the defendant and who was handling the
mop testified that he was using a window cleaner into which
was fastened a handle 6 feet and 3!4 inches in length. (Tr. 206)
That he pulled it down in such a way that it tripped Mrs. Spendlove so that she fell on the sidewalk. He said Mrs. Spendlove
, wasn't close enough to brush his body and that he first knew
of the accident when he felt something strike the end of his
mop handle and then turned around and saw Mrs. Spendlove
falling to the sidewalk. (Tr. 209-210).
The issue of contributory negligence was submitted to the
jury under special interrogatory No. 2 in the following
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language, "Was the plaintiff Levora Spendlove guilty of contributory negligence that proximately caused the injuries which
she received on the 3rd day of january, 1947." The answer to
this was "No."
The defendant has spent much time in his brief arguing
the abstract principle of contributory negligence. He cites
several Montana cases which do not support his position.
Evidently counsel for the defendant was so convinced
himself that there was no contributory negligence in the case
that he didn't make a motion for nonsuit, and never made a
motion for a new trial, yet now he argues that there is a legal
presumption of contributory negligence in the case.
There was nothing presented in the evidence which would
indicate that the plaintiff should have been aware that she
was under any degree of danger.
In conclusion let it be said that the evidence introduced
at the trial and the cases cited by the defendant in no way
substantiate the position he has taken that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory' negligence. This matter was properly
referred to the jury on the pleadings and evidence in the case
and the jury has correctly found that there was no contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
The appellant spends the rest of his brief discussing questions relating to the earnings of Leland Spendlove, husband of
the plaintiff, and the question of the evidence of the plaintiff
concerning her losses resulting from her inability to care for
her chickens.
The court did not submit to the jury any issue on the
earnings of the plaintiff's husband. The evidence relating to

28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the plaintiff's losses in connection with the operation of her
chicken business and special damages of other types was sufficient to sustain the findings for the jury. (See Tr. pp. 68 to
71).

CONCLUSION
Looking now at the case as a whole, we respectfully submit
that under the statutes and decided cases of the State of Utah
there is no theory upon which the appellant's purported bill of
exceptions can be considered as part of the record. Obviously
the courf had no jurisdiction to settle the bill on April 24, and
the filing of the bill in the Supreme Court on May 5, was an
empty act. There have never been any proper proceedings to
revive the rights of the appellant to file a bill of exs:eptions;
no showing has been made of excusable neglect or inadvertence
and no order has yet been entered fixing any time for the filing
of a bill of exceptions or authorizing the filing of it.
Without the bill of exceptions in the record there is really
nothing before the court for decision. Quite clearly the general
demurrer of the defendant to the plaintiff's amended and
supplemental complaint was without merit.
We have not argued at length concerning the appeal on
its merits because we are so definitely convinced that the court
must grant our motion to strike the bill of exceptions. However, even if the court considers the appeal on its merits, practically the only ground for reversal urged by the appellant in
his brief is that the record shows contributory negligence on
the part of the respondent. The record shows this contention
to be without merit.
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the bill of ex-
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ceptions sho,uld be stricken and the appeal dismissed. If for
any reason does not grant the motion to strike the bill of exceptions, we submit that the court should affirm the verdict
of the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
WILSON & WILSON,
Attorneys for Respondent
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